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INTRODUCTION

Since the Fifth' and Fourteenth 2 Amendments to the United States
Constitution guarantee that a person cannot be "deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law," it would seem to follow that under
these precepts a person cannot be incarcerated indefinitely without being
granted a trial by jury. However, the case of Dr. Elizabeth Morgan proves
that this is not always true. Dr. Morgan divorced her husband, Dr. Eric
Foretich, in 1983, and the court awarded her temporary custody of their

1.
2.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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daughter Hilary, with visitation rights to Dr. Foretich.3 Dr. Morgan soon
suspected that her ex-husband sexually abused the girl.4 After four years of
hearings and testimony by dozens of experts, a judge ordered the visits to
continue, finding the evidence of sexual abuse "in equipoise.' '5 In August
1987, the judge granted the child's father a two-week unsupervised visit, so
Dr. Morgan had her parents smuggle Hilary out of the United States, then
refused to tell the judge where she hid the girl.6 The judge held Dr. Morgan
in civil contempt of court and ordered her jailed until she told the court
where Hilary was located.7 Dr. Morgan remained jailed for more than two
years, consistently refusing to disclose her daughter's whereabouts to the
court. At no time was she eligible to have her case heard by a jury.9
The question that arises from cases such as Dr. Morgan's is whether
civil contemnors should be entitled to the due process protections of a jury
trial. Court decisions have postulated four reasons for allowing judges to
punish contempts without a jury trial. First, civil contemnors "carry the keys
of their prison in their own pockets."' 0 Second, courts and judges need the
power to deal summarily with contempt, especially contempt committed in
the presence of the court or near to it, because contempt may obstruct the
administration of justice." Third, because courts derive their power from
the people, contempt against the court is an insult to the authority of the
people, so the court may use its contempt power as a way to compel the contemnor to submit to the court's authority.' 2 Fourth, requiring a court to submit the question of a party's disobedience to another court or to a jury would
13
deprive a proceeding of its efficiency.
However, there are five compelling reasons to entitle civil contemnors to the protections of the jury trial system. First, in cases of coercive
civil contempt, persons who could be held indefinitely should be entitled to
the due process protections of a jury trial.14 Second, because contempt citations and their consequences are seen as punishments, this is inconsistent

3.
JONATHAN GRONER, HILARY'S TRIAL: THE ELIZABETH MORGAN CASE: A CHILD'S
ORDEAL IN AMERICA'S LEGAL SYSTEM, 66-75 (1991).

4.
David J. Harmer, Limiting Incarcerationfor Civil Contempt in Child Custody Cases,
4 BYU J. PUB. L. 239, 257 (1990).
5.
Id. at 267.
6.
GRONER, supra note 3, at 228-32.
7.
Id. at 220.
8.
Id. at 268.
9.
Harmer, supra note 4, at 263-64.
10.
In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
11.
See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924).
12.
See Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341 (Miss. 1858).
13.
See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895).
14.
See Harmer, supra note 4, at 266 (claiming coercive civil contempt gives judges too
much power to imprison a person without the usual checks and balances of the justice system).
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with judicial power, which should be neutral. 5 Punishment is a function of
the executive branch of government.' 6 Third, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that any incarceration for criminal contempt over six
months' duration triggers the right to a jury trial; the same protection should
apply to civil contempt.1 7 Fourth, short-tempered or thin-skinned judges
may abuse the contempt power because they are human and may make mistakes when they become emotionally involved in a situation, or when they
perceive that their authority is being challenged.' 8 Fifth, if the power of the
court emanates from the people, then the people in the form of a jury should
decide if the contempt citation was properly issued.' 9
This article argues that civil contemnors are entitled to the due process protections of a jury trial where incarceration lasts longer than eighteen
months. Part II provides the history and background of the contempt power.
Part III discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's shifting interpretation of contempt powers. Part IV shows how an assault on traditional contempt has
limited the contempt power over time. Part V proposes that civil contemnors be granted a jury trial if their incarceration lasts longer than eighteen
months. Part VI concludes that state and federal district courts should recognize a civil contemnor's right to a jury trial because recent United States
Supreme Court decisions show the Court's preference for due process for
contemnors.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONTEMPT

Definitions
Contempt of court is any act calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court in administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen the
authority or dignity of the court. 20 There are four different classifications of
contemptuous acts. First, contempts may be broadly classified as direct or
indirect. 21 Direct contempts consist of "disruptive or disrespectful behavior
committed in the presence of the court or so near to the court's presence as
to disrupt the administration of justice. '22 Indirect contempts occur outside
the court's presence, such as disobeying a court order to stay away from a
15.
See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 815 (1987)
concurring).
concurring); Id. at 825 (Scalia, J.,
(Blackmun, J.,
16.
Id. at 816 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
17.
See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968).
See Harmer, supra note 4, at 249-50 (citing the example of a judge who jailed and
18.
fined an assistant district attorney who merely responded "I don't believe this" when the
judge ruled against her motion).
19.
See Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341 (Miss. 1858).

20.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 319 (6th ed. 1990).

21.

See Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REv. 345, 349-51

(2000).
22. Id. at 349.
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place or person. 23 Second, contemptuous acts may be either civil or criminal.24 Sanctions for criminal contempt punish the contemnor and vindicate
the authority of the court, and are therefore punitive in nature. 25 Civil contempt sanctions are remedial in nature and benefit the complainant.2 6 While
these definitions seem simple enough, they do not reveal the complexity and
the nuances inherent in the contempt issue. Even the United States Supreme
Court has admitted that "[c]ontempts are neither wholly civil nor altogether
criminal. . . . [A] particular act . . . may partake the characteristics of
both."27
Judges may still summarily punish direct criminal contempts if the
offense is petty.28 This is allowed for two reasons. First, protections of a
jury trial generally balance the interest of the accused against the resources
of the state.29 If the judge personally witnessed the contumacious conduct,
little additional evidence needs to be presented. 30 Second, summary procedures are necessary for an orderly adjudication process. 31 For these two reasons, a judge may immediately punish the direct contemnor for his or her
disobedience. 32 The punishment may be a determinate prison sentence or a
fixed monetary fine, which is paid to the court. 33 The criminal conternor
34
may not avoid imprisonment or the fine by performing an affirmative act.
In contrast, indirect criminal contempts occur outside the presence
of the court, and are of the type of which the court has no knowledge. 35 Because the judge does not have personal knowledge of the facts of an indirect
contempt, the accused is entitled to the constitutional protections afforded in
any criminal trial, including the right to a jury for serious violations resulting
in serious sanctions. 36 Indirect criminal contempts include acts of disobey23.
Id. at 351.
24.
Id. at 347.
25.
See Joel M. Androphy & Keith A. Byers, Federal Contempt of Court, 61 TEX. B.J.
16, 18 (1998).
26.
Id.
27.
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,441 (1911).
28.
See Livingston, supra note 21, at 350.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id. (noting that a judge should not be required to interrupt the current trial in order to
hold a separate contempt proceeding).
32.
Id. at 347.
33.
See Androphy, supra note 26, at 26 (stating that "[i]mprisonment and/or fines are the
traditional forms of sanctions imposed in both civil and criminal contempt proceedings").
34.
Id. at 18 (discussing how a coercive civil contempt sanction may be avoided by obeying the court's order, but the criminal contempt sanction is intended to be punitive).
35.
Philip A. Hostak, InternationalUnion, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell: A Paradigm
Shift in the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 181, 186
(1995).
36.
See Livingston, supra note 21, at 353-54. Other required criminal procedure protections for criminal contemnors are the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel,
the presumption of innocence, and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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ing the court's writs and orders, such as violating an injunction issued by the
court. 37 In 1968, the United States Supreme Court held that all criminal38contemnors are entitled to a jury trial if the contempt is not a petty offense.
On the other hand, civil contempts are imposed on the contemnor to
benefit the complainant. 39 Civil contempts may be either remedial or coercive. 40 Remedial civil contempt sanctions compensate plaintiffs for damages
suffered because of the contemnor's disobedience of a court order. 41 For
example, if a court orders a defendant not to sell a disputed tract of land until
its ownership is determined and the defendant sells it anyway, the judge may
order remedial sanctions in the amount to compensate the plaintiff for the
value of the property.42
In comparison, courts impose coercive contempt sanctions to pressure the civil contemnor into complying with a court order that she has refused to obey. 43 If a civil contemnor refuses to obey a court-ordered injunction, the court may impose per diem fines or imprisonment until she complies."4 Civil contempt fines are paid to the complainant. 5 However, the
central characteristic of a coercive civil contempt sanction is that the contemnor may end the sanction by obeying the court order.46 This is why
courts often quote the adage that civil contemnors "carry the keys of their
prison in their own pockets. 47 Civil contemnors have no constitutional right
to a jury trial, although they do receive the due process protections of notice
and a hearing.48

37.
Id. at 358. Congress limited the power of judges to punish those who criticized them
by passing legislation allowing contempt citations only for misbehavior in the presence of the
court, disobeying writs or orders, and contumacious conduct by court officers. Id.
38.
See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (968) (noting that the Supreme Court has
not drawn an exact line between petty and serious crimes, but if a crime is punishable by up
to two years in prison, it is not a petty offense).
39.
See Livingston, supra note 21, at 351-52.
40.
Id. at 351.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 351-52.
43.
See Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911) (stating that
imprisonment for civil contempt is "intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do
what he had refused to do.").
44.
See generally Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829
(1994) (discussing a court's ability to impose either coercive imprisonment or fines to force a
contemnor to obey a court order).
45.
See Livingston, supra note 21, at 352. Remedial civil contempt fines are another
form of damages paid to the plaintiff, which he must prove in order to collect as in any other
form of damages. Id.
46.
Id.
47.
In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
48.
See Jacqueline G. Miller, Authority of the Trial Judge, 80 GEO. L.J. 1412, 1423
(1992).
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The difficulty lies in distinguishing between criminal and civil contempt. Some of the problem stems from the fact that contumacious acts
from criminal cases could lead to either civil or criminal contempt and vice
versa. 49 Until recently, courts used the test adopted in the Gompers case,
50
which focused on character and purpose of the sanctions imposed. Taken
literally, the Gompers test determined civil or criminal contempt based on
5
whether the court phrased the order in mandatory or prohibitory terms. If
the defendant refused to do an affirmative act required by a court order, it
was an act of civil contempt.52 If the defendant did something the court
53
criminal contempt.
commanded him not to do, however, it was an act of
54
The Supreme Court gave as an example the case of a striking union. If the
union members disobeyed an injunctive order that said, "Go back to work,"
it would be considered civil contempt because the court order mandated a
specific act. 55 However, if the union disobeyed an injunctive order that said,
"Do not strike," it5 6would be a criminal contempt because the court intended
to prohibit an act.
Unfortunately, the character and purpose test is amorphous and unhelpful in many cases. This is because the court did not address more substantive concerns, such as the conduct itself, due process requirements, or
the potential for arbitrary or biased rulings.5 7 The confusion over contempt
classification is apparent when reading cases regarding contempt. Even the
United States Supreme Court has admitted that contumacious acts are "neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal, ' 8 and sanctions may include elements of both civil and criminal contempt.5 9 This article, however, will
show that changes in court interpretation of contempt law, including an expanded test to distinguish civil from criminal contempt, provides hope of
expanded due process protections for civil contemnors.

See Androphy, supra note 25, at 18 (noting that in some cases, a single act of con49.
tempt could result in both civil and criminal contempt sanctions).
See Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911) (stating that
50.
"[it is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases").
See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 835 (1994).
51.
See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442.
52.
Id.
53.
See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 835.
54.
Id.
55.
Id. But the Court stated that these distinctions were sometimes difficult to apply,
56.
especially if the court order contained both mandatory and prohibitory provisions. Id.
See generally Hostak, supra note 35, at 185-87 (describing how Bobby Seale was
57.
bound and gagged in court to prevent more contumacious outbursts).
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).
58.
See Poston v. Poston, 502 S.E.2d 86, 91 (S.C. 1998).
59.
See Hostak, supra note 35, at 221-22 (stating that the Bagwell decision can "be the
60.
new paradigm by which contempt is understood, one that brings the contempt power in line
with contemporary notions of procedural fairness").
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Appeal of Contempt Judgments
Appealing a contempt citation may not provide an accused contemnor with sufficient procedural protections. 6 1 The right to appeal varies with
the type of contempt judgment against a person.62 An order judging a person
in criminal contempt is a final judgment and therefore subject to immediate
appeal. 63 This applies regardless of whether the contemnor is a party or nonparty to the case. Judgments of civil contempt against non-parties are generally final and appealable immediately. 65 Civil contemnors under the recalcitrant witness statute are entitled to an appeal within 30 days of the contempt filing.66 Nevertheless, because courts consider other civil contempt
citations interlocutory, they may not be challenged on appeal until judgment
is final. 67 Although many civil contemnors eventually appeal their sentences, appellate courts "tend to treat trial court contempt convictions with
great deference. 6 8 Some appellate courts do not even consider the question
of whether the alleged conduct was truly contumacious. 69 Instead, they
merely determine whether the judge abused his discretion. 70 The standard of
review for civil contempt is the "clearly erroneous" standard. 7'
The result of this narrow appeal procedure is that appellate judges
assume that the trial judge's actions and assessments of the contemnor's acts
are fair, accurate, and unbiased.72 Although these assumptions may be true
for most cases, extra care must be taken to assure that all contemnors have
access to an unbiased party to determine the appropriateness of a contempt
sentence.73 Under these circumstances, the only way to assure a civil contemnor of his Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection
is to give him the right to have his case heard by a jury.74

61.
See Harmer, supra note 4, at 253-54 (pointing out that although most judges are fair,
restrained and impartial, accused contemnors require procedural due process protections
against those judges who are prejudiced).
62.
See Androphy, supra note 25, at 27.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65.
Id.
66.
28 U.S.C. § 1826(b).
67.
See Androphy, supra note 25, at 27.
68.
See Harmer, supra note 4, at 253.
69.
Id.
70. Id. (stating that most judges are allowed broad discretion in pursuing contempt citations).
71.
See Androphy, supra note 25, at 27.
72. See Harmer, supra note 4, at 253 ("From what judges have attempted and have done
in times past... we may draw some pretty shrewd conclusions as to what, if unchecked, they
may attempt, and may do, in times present." (citation omitted)).
73. See id.
74. Id. at 272.
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Common Law History
Judicial theories allowing courts a power similar to modem contempt have been found in the legal code of the Roman Emperor Justinian.75
In early English law, the power of contempt emanated from the King. Because courts were considered representatives of the King, the King was presumed to be present and being personally contemned. 76 There were no constraints on punishments and contemnors not only suffered indefinite jail
terms, but also sometimes forfeited property, suffered dismemberment, and
were summarily executed. 77 Regarding the basis for authorizing the contempt power, legal scholars point to the assertion in Blackstone's commentaries that all contempts were tried summarily at common law.78 However,
Sir John Fox refuted the validity of this assertion based on numerous authorities dating back to the thirteenth century. 9 In fact, Fox found the sole
reference to summary contempt power in an undelivered opinion by Justice
Sir John Eardley-Wilmot in a case known as The King v. Almon.80 Assuming this is true, modem contempt power in the United States may be traced
back to the judicial philosophies of only two men: Wilmot and Blackstone.8 '
Regardless of this scant authority, the summary power to punish contempt
United States with the British colonists and the common law
migrated to the 82

judicial system.

LegislativeHistory
Congress has periodically passed legislation affecting courts' ability
to wield the contempt power. The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred on federal courts the power to punish contempts, thereby giving judges the right to
impose sanctions for contempt of court from nearly the inception of our con83
Additionally, the due process
stitutionally-based system of government.
5
84
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution limit the contempt power indirectly by requiring a hearing, 8if7
86
In 1914, the Clayton Act
not a full jury trial, in most legal proceedings.

75.

Id. at 245-46.

76.

See Hostak, supra note 35, at 186-87.

77.
Id.
78.
Id. at 188.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81.
Id.
82.
See Hostak, supra note 35, at 189. Hostak compares the contempt power of American courts to the image of Athena springing full-grown and armor-clad from the head of Zeus.
Id. Similarly, courts in this country were vested with the contempt power the moment they
were formed. Id.
83.
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
85.
86. See Hostak, supra note 35, at 190.
Clayton Act, §§ 21-22, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
87.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol3/iss1/5
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allowed federal criminal contemnors the right to a jury trial if the contumacious act was also a criminal offense under state or federal law. 8 The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 193289 curbed contempt powers by limiting a court's
90
power to issue and enforce injunctions in private sector labor disputes.
The current federal statute governing contempt is 18 U.S.C. § 401,
which grants federal courts the power to cite a person or entity for general
contempt. 9' The broad wording of the statute has led to an enormous
amount of litigation. 92 The applicable section of the code states:
A court of the United States shall have the power to punish
by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of
its authority, and none other, as ... (1) Misbehavior of any
person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice; (2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.93
The statute therefore gives courts sole authority to punish any misbehavior
of persons under the authority of the court without requiring due process
protections of a jury trial. 94 It is important to note that this section only applies to federal courts. Each state has its own laws regarding contempt, so
any federal changes to the code would not necessarily affect persons held in
contempt in state courts.95
There is no analogous statute governing general acts of civil contempt. However, 28 U.S.C. §1826, often referred to as the federal recalcitrant witness statute, limits imprisonment for coercive civil contemnors under certain circumstances. 97 This statute comes into play whenever a witness
88.
See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 70 (1924).
89.
Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932).
90.
See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. United States, 330 U.S. 258, 270-73 (1947).
91.
18 U.S.C. § 401 (2002).
92.
See Livingston, supra note 21, at 345-46 (noting that courts have struggled with the
boundaries of the contempt power since the beginning of our country, and there is still confusion regarding its appropriate usage).
93.
18 U.S.C. § 401.
94.
See Livingston, supra note 21, at 345-46
95.
See Harmer, supra note 4, at 269 (explaining that the Congressional bill to free Dr.
Elizabeth Morgan would not affect most other child custody contempt cases, since Congress
can pass laws that apply only to federal courts, and child custody cases must be brought in
state courts).
96.
See Androphy, supra note 25, at 25. Before a court can impose civil contempt sanctions based on violations of a court order, the court only needs to prove: (1) the court order
was valid and lawful; (2) the order was clear and unambiguous; and (3) the contemnor had the
ability to comply with the order. Id.
97.
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a).
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before a United States court or grand jury refuses to testify or provide other
information without just cause. 98 The judge may then summarily order the
99
witness confined until the witness changes his mind. The statute states:
No period of such confinement shall exceed the life of - (1)
the court proceeding, or (2) the term of the grand jury including extensions, before which refusal to comply with the
court order occurred, but in no event shall such confinement
exceed eighteen months.'0 0
Under this statute, incarceration for civil contempt is limited to no more than
0
eighteen months, but only for certain contumacious acts.' ' Therefore, current statutory law does not guarantee civil contemnors the protections of0 due
description.' 2
process unless the contumacious act fits within the statutory

A SHIFTING PARADIGM INCONTEMPT CASE LAW
Contempt convictions have resulted in a great deal of litigation because of the uncertain nature of contempt, based on the similarities between
criminal and civil contempt. Moreover, because of the ambiguities in the
purpose and character test, accused contemnors have heavily litigated the
issue of determining the difference between civil and criminal contempt.
Over the last one hundred years there has been a gradual change in contempt
law, mostly accomplished by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the law. A review of these cases shows the interpretation of contempt law evolving to require more due process protections for both civil
and criminal contemnors.
One of the first important cases regarding coercive civil contempt
was In re Nevitt in 1902.103 In Nevitt, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri ordered the judges of the county court of St.
14
Clair County, Missouri, to levy a tax on the citizens of the county. 0 The
levy was necessary to pay a money judgment against the county stemming
0 5 The
from a lawsuit regarding the validity of bonds issued by the county.'
county judges refused to levy the tax, so the court held them in civil con06
The
tempt and ordered them incarcerated until they obeyed the order.'
county judges appealed the contempt charge to the Eighth Circuit Court of

98.
99.

Id.
Id.

100.

Id.

101.
102.

Id.
Id.

103.
104.
105.
106.

117 F. 448 (8th Cir. 1902).
See id. at 449.
Id.
Id.
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Appeals, which denied their petition. 10 7 In its decision, the Eighth Circuit
was the first court to use the phrase that has almost become a mantra regarding coercive civil contempt. This is the belief that coercive civil contemnors
"carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets."'' 08 The Court of
Appeals refused to release the county court judges, declaring, "The law will
not bargain with anybody to let its courts be defied for a specific term of
imprisonment. . . . [E]ach is detained until he finds himself willing to
109
conform."'

In 1911, the United States Supreme Court enunciated its first test for
determining whether a contumacious act constituted a civil or criminal violation in Gompers v. Buck's Stove and Range Company."0 In Gompers, a
labor union boycotted a company because of alleged unfair labor practices. 111 The trial court issued first a temporary, and then a permanent, injunction forbidding the union from boycotting or disseminating information
to the public regarding the allegations made against the company. 1 2 When
union members violated the injunction, the company requested that the court
hold the members in contempt." 3 The court did so and sentenced three of
the offenders to jail terms ranging from six to twelve months. 4 The Supreme Court declared that differences between civil and criminal contempts
are not determined by the punishment (in this case, a jail sentence), but
rather by the "character and purpose" of that punishment." 5 The Court
stated that in criminal contempt proceedings, an accused contemnor is entitled to more substantial rights and constitutional privileges than is a civil
contemnor 16 The Supreme Court then reversed and remanded the case
back to the trial court because it found that the court had imposed punitive
7
criminal contempt sentences on a civil contempt complaint."
Fourteen years after Gompers, the Supreme Court interpreted the
Constitution as requiring greater protections for contemnors whose acts occurred away from open court, or indirect contempts. In Cooke v. United
States,"'8 a trial judge convicted an attorney of contempt in a summary proceeding after the attorney wrote a letter to the judge and accused him of bias
and unfairness toward the attorney's client." 9 The Supreme Court determined that because the contumacious act did not occur in open court, the
107.
108.

Id. at 460.
Id.

109.

Id.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

221 U.S. 418 (1911).
See id at 441.
Id. at 420-21.
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 424-25.
See id. at 441.
Id at 444-45.
Id. at 452.
267 U.S. 517 (1925).
See id. at 533-34.
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accused attorney was entitled to have advance notice of charges made and be
given a reasonable opportunity to defend against them under due process
considerations. 20 Chief Justice Taft wrote in the Court's decision that "the
intention with which acts of contempt have been committed must necessarily
degree of guilt .... [T]he
and properly have an important bearing on the
' 21
mitigation.'
in
evidence
exclude
court cannot
The trend toward granting more due process protections to contemnors faced a setback in 1966, when the Supreme Court approved indefinite
imprisonment as an appropriate coercive measure for civil contemnors who
refused to testify as witnesses in a grand jury proceeding. 22 Salvatore Shillitani was called as a witness in a grand jury proceeding, but refused to answer questions regarding drug dealing, even though he was granted immunity in exchange for his testimony.' 23 The judge imprisoned him for two
proceedings. 24
years or until he agreed to answer questions in the grand jury
Shillitani appealed, contending his punishment was for criminal contempt
and he was denied a jury trial.' 2 The Court determined that the contempt
was civil in nature based on the conditional and coercive nature of the imprisonment. 26 The Court justified the coercive imprisonment without a jury
27 Howtrial "provided that the usual due process requirements are met.'
ever, in a precursor to the Federal Recalcitrant Witness Act, the Court ruled
that the definite two-year sentence was improper because a contumacious
28
witness cannot be held after the grand jury has been discharged.
Only two years later, however, the Supreme Court granted greater
protections to criminal contemnors.129 Bloom v. Illinois involved an attorney
sentenced to two years in prison for contempt because he knowingly filed a
false will with the probate court.' 30 He demanded, but was refused, a jury
trial.' 31 For the first time, the Supreme Court determined that a criminal
contempt is a crime in every essential aspect and therefore no difference
32 The Court
exists between criminal contempt and other serious crimes.'
briefly discussed the history of criminal contempt cases and determined
"This course of events demonstrates the unwisdom of vesting the judiciary
with completely untrammeled power to punish contempt, and makes clear
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966).
Id. at 365-66.
Id. at 366-67.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 371.
See id.
See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
Id. at 195.
Id.
Id. at 201-02.
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the need for effective safeguards against that power's abuse.' 33 Therefore,
the Court ruled that in order to protect against "arbitrary exercise of official
power," a criminal contemnor who may be subject to a lengthy jail term
must have the protections of the Constitution, including a jury trial. 3 4
Most recently, the Supreme Court expanded the Gompers "character
and purpose test" into a five-pronged analysis for determining if a contemptuous act is civil or criminal. In InternationalUnion, UnitedMine Workers
v. Bagwell, striking miners violated a court injunction that set out guidelines
for picketing and forbade disruptive and destructive actions by the striking
workers. 35 After numerous violations of the injunction, the court announced a fine schedule for future infractions in an attempt to enforce the
injunction. 36 When the strike ended, the union owed $64 million in fines
for violations of the injunction - $12 million to the companies and the rest to
the Commonwealth of Virginia representing law enforcement costs.' 37 In
the settlement agreement both parties agreed to vacate the fines, but the Virginia Supreme Court held that the fines payable to the state could not be
38
vacated because they were for the benefit of the public, not the companies.
The United States Supreme Court enunciated a new test, listing five
factors to examine in order to determine if a contumacious act is civil or
criminal in nature. The five factors are 1) Gompers' character and purpose
test; 2) whether or not a purge clause exists; 3) whether the injunction violated was complex or simple; 4) whether the sanction imposed was petty or
serious; and 5) the existence of state legislation regarding contempt sanctions.139 A purge clause means the contemnor may avoid or reduce additional fines or imprisonment by subsequently obeying the court order. 14
The Supreme Court found that the Gompers test was not determinative, but
did find that the union could not purge the contempt.141 The court issued a
complex injunction, the fines were serious and there was no state legislation. 42 Therefore, the fines were criminal in nature because the union was
1 43
denied due process by the trial court's imposition of a criminal sanction.
Virginia therefore could not collect the fines awarded it under the injunction. 14

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 207.
Id. at 201-02.
512 U.S. 821,835-38 (1994).
See id. at 824.
Id.
Id. at 825-26.
Id. at 835-38.
Id. at 828-29.
See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828-29.
Id.
Id. at 838-39.
Id. at 839.
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THE ASSAULT ON TRADITIONAL CONTEMPT

In order to determine if civil contemnors should be entitled to a jury
trial, the validity of the rationales for denying jury trials must be analyzed.
First, this article examines the Congressional act passed in response to one
woman's civil contempt incarceration. Second, this article will examine the
rationales courts have given to allow summary adjudication of contempt.
Third, the changing philosophy of the Supreme Court in its interpretation of
the law will be discussed. Fourth, a discussion of the reasons compelling
jury trials will be analyzed. Fifth, this article discusses implementation of a
proposed jury trial system for civil contemnors.
The Coercive Civil Contempt Saga of Dr.Elizabeth Morgan
As stated in the introduction, Dr. Elizabeth Morgan endured twentyfive months imprisonment for coercive civil contempt and was not eligible
for a jury trial.' 5 Judge Herbert Dixon, Jr., confined Morgan on three separate occasions for violating Foretich's visitation rights with their daughter
Hilary. 146 Morgan produced child psychologists and other experts to testify
that they believed Hilary had been sexually abused by her father, but
47
Foretich supplied experts of his own refuting the other experts' testimony.
In August 1987, Judge Dixon ordered a two-week unsupervised visit because he found the evidence of abuse "in equipoise."' 148 Soon after, Morgan's parents fled to Great Britain and then to New Zealand with Hilary, and
Morgan began serving her coercive civil contempt sentence. 4 9
The only statute regarding coercive civil contempt under federal law
is the Federal Recalcitrant Witness Act.' 50 This provision, however, does
not protect persons who defy court orders for reasons other than those expressly included within the statute. Morgan is an example of a civil contemnor who did not fall under the protection of this statute. She was not a recalcitrant witness; she was in contempt for refusing to produce her daughter for
a court-ordered visitation with the child's father because she wanted to protect the girl from alleged sexual abuse.' 5' In Morgan's mind, defying the

See Harmer, supra note 4, at 239-40.
145.
146.
See GRONER, supra note 3, at 229.
147.
Id. at 139. Child advocates and supporters of Morgan were incensed by Judge
Dixon's visitation order after his "equipoise" statement. See Harmer, supra note 4, at 267.
Some asked analogous questions, such as, "If you thought you had a 50-50 chance of being
raped on the way to the movies, would you go?" Id.
148.
See GRONER, supra note 3, at 218-30.
149.
Id. at 251-53.
150.
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a).
See Harmer, supranote 4, at 240.
151.
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remaining in prison was the only way to guarantee
authority of the court and
52
safety.1
her daughter's
At least three powerful arguments may be made for entitling civil
contemnors in Morgan's situation to a jury trial. First, Judge Dixon presided
over the entire child custody battle and he did not believe and/or excluded
evidence of sexual abuse.' 5 Second, at some point the judge ordered the
case to be under seal and barred all reporters from the courtroom, so only
participants in the proceeding knew what occurred in the court.' 54 Although
55
this was done to protect Hilary's privacy because she was a minor,' it prevented neutral parties from assessing Judge Dixon's fairness in deciding the
facts in the case.' 56 Third, Morgan's long incarceration appeared to be due to
vindictiveness on the part of Judge Dixon, who seemed incensed that Morgan would defy his orders for such a long time.' 57 Indeed, one unidentified
D.C. Superior Court judge admitted that the rule of thumb was that if a civil
contemnor had not been coerced into compliance within six months, he
would never relent.'5 8 Nevertheless, after Dr. Morgan had already been in
jail for fifteen months Judge Dixon denied a petition to release her, stating,
"[T]he coercion has only just begun .... It could be a year, it could be more
59 Althan that" before he would believe that Morgan would not relent.'
though Judge Dixon only may have been doing his job as he saw fit, he arguably became personally involved in the case, requiring an independent
review of his decisions regarding Morgan's contempt incarceration.,60 Although the purpose of the Court of Appeals was to review such decisions,
this court could only determine whether Judge 6Dixon properly applied the
law to the case, not reassess the findings of fact.' '
Congress Weighs In: Changes to D.C. CODEANN. § 11-741
In response to Morgan's plight, Congress decided to step into the
controversy. 62 Bills limiting coercive civil contempt incarceration, were
See GRONER, supra note 3, at 234.
152.
See Harmer, supra note 4, at 259. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
153.
found that Judge Dixon abused his discretion by excluding evidence that Dr. Foretich's other
daughter, Heather, also showed signs of sexual abuse, finding this evidence "highly relevant
to disputed issues in this case." Id.
154. Id. at 260 (stating that a former attorney general of Maryland complained that because
reporters were barred from the court, the public did not know the strength of Dr. Morgan's
evidence).
155. See GRONER, supra note 3, at 92.
156. Id. at 218-19.
157. See Harmer, supra note 4, at 263 (characterizing the contempt sanctions against Morgan as a "dispute" between her and Judge Dixon).
158. Id. at 262.
Id. at 263-64.
159.
See GRONER, supra note 3, at 161.
160.
Id. at 146-47.
161.
See Harmer, supranote 4, at 269.
162.
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introduced and passed in both the House and Senate in 1989 and President
George H.W. Bush signed the District of Columbia Civil Contempt Imprisonment Act of 1989 on September 23, 1989.163 This law only applied to
persons incarcerated for civil contempt in child custody proceedings in the
courts of the District of Columbia. 164 It allowed a person to be prosecuted
for criminal contempt after six months' incarceration for civil contempt and
limited civil incarcerations without criminal prosecutions to twelve
months.165 No person could be held pending criminal trial for more than
eighteen months based on the civil contempt charge. 166 A person thus prosecuted could request a trial by jury. 167 If imprisoned for contempt, the contemnor could request and be given an expedited appeal to the D.C. Court of
68
Appeals within sixty days of such request.'
Although the statute applied to any civil contemnor in a child custody case, the new law directly affected only one person: Dr. Elizabeth Morgan. 169 Two days after the President signed the Act into law, Morgan was
released from jail.1 70 Private detectives located Hilary in Christchurch, New
Zealand, in February 1990, and both Foretich and Morgan flew there to continue the custody and visitation battle. 17' Eventually, Morgan moved to
Christchurch to keep Hilary (now called 72
Ellen) under the jurisdiction of the
more child-friendly New Zealand courts.
Congress cannot change the law of contempt across the nation because each state has the power to promulgate its own laws regarding contempt. 73 However, by passing this act, Congress made a very strong, clear
policy statement that it disapproves of unlimited coercive imprisonment of
persons without due process protection of a jury trial, at least in custody
cases. 174 Given that Congress felt so strongly about due process for a civil
contemnor in a child custody case, one might infer that all civil contemnors
should be afforded the same protections. 175

163.
164.
165.

Id. at 276.
D.C. CODEANN. § 11-741 (Supp. 2001).
Id.

166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.

169. See Harmer, supra note 4, at 273. Many judges were critical of this bill, accusing
Congress of getting involved in judicial matters, and called it "private justice" for Morgan.
Id. at 277. However, other observers were more critical of the way judges handle coercive
contempt and therefore favored the legislation. Id.
170. Id. at 277.
171.
See GRONER, supra note 3, at 270-7 1.
172.
Id. at 252, 275.
173.
See Harmer, supra note 4, at 278-79.
174. Id. at 276.
175.
Id. at 278-79.
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Rationalesfor Summary Adjudication of Contempt
The first reason courts often give for denying civil contemnors the
protection of a jury trial is that under coercive civil contempt, these contem76 This reasoning
nors "carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets."'
assumes that the contemnor is being purposefully stubborn to anger the
77 For excourt, not that there may be valid reasons for failure to comply.'
ample, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a person is not justified
when refusing to testify under the "just cause" provisions of the Federal Recalcitrant Witness Statute merely because he fears for his own safety or the
safety of others. 178 The court relied on dicta from Piemonte v. United
States179 that such concerns did not provide a legal basis for refusal to testify.' 80 The Supreme Court stated in a footnote to Piemonte that the man's
testimony was required for an investigation in the public interest, and his
8
from testifying.,
fear for himself and his family was not a valid excuse
This reasoning is troublesome. Although the government's interest in investigating possible crimes and uncovering the truth in an investigation is im82
family members.'
portant, it is arguably not worth the lives of innocent
Requiring such persons to testify presents these witnesses with a true
Hobson's choice - their only options being a coercive prison sentence or
someone's death.183 In cases such as this, a jury should determine if the contemnor's information is important enough to require possible long-term incarceration to force her to testify. If the jury finds imprisonment justified,
the witness may still sit in jail for up to eighteen months for refusing to testify, but his due process rights will have been preserved.
A second reason used by courts to deny a civil contemnor a jury trial
and judges need the power to deal summarily with contempt to
courts
that
is
avoid obstruction of justice. 84 Although certain direct contempts should be
decided summarily, most of these arguably would fall under the petty criminal contempt category. 85 For example, outbursts in the courtroom and other
behaviors that impair the ability of the court to perform its duties should be
adjudicated immediately, but various commentators agree that these acts
In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
176.
See Harmer, supra note 4, at 256 (theorizing that any person ordered to take a "mor177.
ally repugnant" action would not be able to comply with an order that violated her moral
beliefs).
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 922 F.2d 1266, 1272 (6th Cir. 1991).
178.
367 U.S. 556, 560-61 (1961).
179.
See In re GrandJury Investigation,922 F.2d. at 1272 (stating that "fear for the safety
180.
of one's self or others is not a ground for refusing to testify" (citation omitted)).
See Piemonte, 367 U.S. at 560-61.
181.
Id. at 564.
182.
See Harmer, supra note 4, at 240.
183.
See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924).
184.
See Androphy, supra note 25, at 20 (explaining that summary contempt sanctions are
185.
only justified "where there is a need for immediate vindication of the court's dignity and
authority").
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would be considered criminal contempt offenses. 186 A long-term coercive
civil contempt sentence, such as the type imposed on Morgan, does not address the problem of obstruction of justice by contemnors refusing to obey
court orders.' 87 Instead, many observers argue that long-term incarcerations
such as hers create disrespect for the law because such imprisonments show
"disregard of humane concerns."' 88 One way of regaining respect for the
law is to allow persons summarily jailed for civil contempt a trial by jury,
perhaps under similar guidelines as those passed by Congress in the District
of Columbia Civil Contempt Imprisonment Act or 1989.189
The third argument is that courts derive power from the people and
that contempt against the court is an insult to the authority of the people. 9°
Proponents of this argument reason that the court must use its power of contempt to compel the contemnor to submit to the court's authority. 9' This,
however, is actually an argument for allowing jury trials to civil contemnors,
because if the authority for contempt is derived from the people, then a jury
trial is needed to allow the people to decide the case on its merits.
The fourth argument is that a jury trial for accused contemnors
makes court proceedings inefficient.' 92 The Supreme Court's reasoning for
this statement is that because a court has power to order a person to do
something, the court must also have the power to punish disobedience., 93 In
Debs, the Court wrote: "This is no technical rule. In order that a court may
compel obedience to its order it must have the right to inquire whether there
has been any disobedience thereof."' 94 Although this has been a basis for
denying a jury trial to criminal contemnors since it was first written, constitutional considerations of justice under the Sixth Amendment guarantee a
jury trial for all criminal prosecutions.' 95 However, until Bloom was decided
in 1968, the Supreme Court consistently ruled that it was constitutional to
punish criminal contempt without a jury trial because it "was considered
essential to the proper and effective functioning of the courts and to the ad186. See Livingston, supra note 21, at 350 (stating that "direct contempt is undoubtedly
criminal in nature," but does not require a full criminal trial).
187. Id. at 397 (noting that most judges believe that coercive fines and jail sentences will
quickly compel contemnors to obey their orders, but that a given segment of contemnors
refuse to comply for a variety of reasons).
188. Harmer, supra note 4, at 266 (criticizing coercive civil contempt because it gives
judges sole power to "deprive a citizen of liberty without the usual checks from a prosecuting
attorney, a grand jury, and a jury").
189. See id. at 278.
190. See Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341 (Miss. 1858).
191. Id. at 341-42.
192. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895).
193. See id. at 594 (explaining that "the power of a court to make an order carries with it
the equal power to punish for a disobedience of that order" and it is the duty of that court to
investigate and punish disobedience).
194. Id. at 595.
195.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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ministration of justice."1 96 The Supreme Court in Bloom reversed its position, and opined:
The rule of our prior cases has strong, though sharply challenged, historical support; but neither this circumstance nor
the considerations of necessity and efficiency normally ofdenying a
fered in defense of the established rule, justify
97
1
cases.
contempt
criminal
jury trial in serious
Therefore, although the practice of summary judgment for criminal contemnors had strong historical support, the Court determined that the Constitution
required a jury trial. 198 This ruling indicated that the Court finally agreed
a
that for criminal contumacious acts that would result in serious penalties,
99
Amendment.
Sixth
the
of
provisions
jury trial was mandated by the
Reasons to Require Jury Trialsfor Civil Contemnors
Although prior court rulings have ruled that civil contemnors do not
have a right to a jury trial prior to incarceration, there are compelling reasons
for changing this precedent. Several of these reasons come directly from the
Constitution itself, under theories of due process, separation of powers, and
the right to a jury trial.
The first reason civil contemnors should be allowed protection of a
jury trial is because without it, civil contemnors could be held indefinitely
without being afforded due process. For example, Jacqueline Bouknight
spent over seven years in jail for refusing to produce her son, Maurice Miles,
for the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (BCDSS) as required. 200 A juvenile court gave BCDSS jurisdiction over Maurice because
hospital personnel treating the boy for severe injuries suspected Bouknight
of child abuse.20 ' When cited for civil contempt for failure to produce her
son for BCDSS workers as required by the juvenile court, Bouknight in20 2
She argued
voked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
that by producing Maurice, she would admit to control over his person and
20 3 Although she
thereby subject herself to possible criminal prosecution.
196. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 196 (1968).
197. See id. at 198-99.
198. Id.
Id. at 210-11.
199.
Paul W. Valentine, Woman, Jailedfor Contempt, FreedAfter 7 Years; Mother Failed
200.
to Reveal Son's Location, WASH. POST, November 1, 1995, at D1.
Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 552-53 (1990). The
201.
evidence showed that Maurice was hospitalized with a broken left leg when he was only three
months old, and he had several other partially healed bone fractures. Id. Additionally, nurses
observed Bouknight shaking Maurice and dropping him into his crib. Id.
202. See id. at 553.
203. Id. at 554.
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claimed that her refusal to produce Maurice was because she did not want to
have her son placed in an abusive foster home similar to the one in which
she grew up, Maryland prosecutors believe that Bouknight invoked her Fifth
Amendment right because her abuse resulted in Maurice's death.2 °4
Juvenile court Judge David Mitchell held a series of hearings where
Bouknight was repeatedly asked to produce Maurice. First she claimed that
he was with an aunt in Baltimore, then with relatives in Dallas.20 5 Finally,
Bouknight insisted that she put Maurice in the care of a woman named
20 6
"Rachael Anderson," but police investigations failed to find such a person.
Judge Mitchell ordered Bouknight jailed for contempt until she produced her
son or revealed his location to the court.20 7 Judge Mitchell rejected her
claim that producing Maurice would violate her guarantee against selfincrimination, stating that the imprisonment was because she refused to obey
a lawful order of the court. 20 8 The Maryland Court of Appeals vacated the
contempt order, determining that if Bouknight produced Maurice, then she
showed a measure of control over his person under circumstances which
might lead to her prosecution. 20 9 BCDSS requested a writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, which
granted both the writ and a stay of the
210
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, stating: "The
Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a
regulatory regime constructed to effect the State's public purpose unrelated
to the enforcement of its criminal laws." 2t ' That ruling meant that
Bouknight had to turn Maurice over to the BCDSS or stay in jail until she
complied.2t 2 She never obeyed.2t 3 In October 1995, BCDSS moved to release her and Judge Mitchell granted the motion after Bouknight spent more
than seven years in jail, apparently deciding that if she had not yet relented,
she never would.214 Although her unusual use of the Fifth Amendment as a
defense to a civil contempt sanction allowed her to appeal the contempt cita-

204. See Valentine, supra note 201.
205.
Kate Shatzkin, Obscured by Fuss of Bouknight Case; Little Boy Lost: The Legal
Questions in the Case of Jacqueline Bouknight Threaten to Obscure the Small Boy Whose
Whereabouts She Has Refused to Reveal for Seven Years, BALT. SUN, Oct. 31, 1995, at IA
[hereinafter Obscured].
206.
Kate Shatzkin, Bouknight Calls Jailing 'Something I Had to Do '; She Says She Saved
Son From FosterCare, THE BALT. SuN, Nov. 2, 1995, at IB.
207. See id.
208. See Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1990).
209. Id. at 554.
210. Id.
211.
Id. at 556.
212. See Valentine, supra note 201.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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tion, she was never eligible for a jury trial. 215 Even though her circumstances were less sympathetic than those of Morgan, Bouknight's civil contempt incarceration bothered persons concerned with her due process
rights. 21 6 Interestingly, Bouknight did not argue that the length of her incar217 This
ceration entitled her to a jury trial or other due process protections.
may be because she had been in prison less than two years by the time the
Supreme Court decided the case. 2t 8 However, her oversight means that the
Supreme Court has not recently considered the question of21 9due process requirements for long-term incarceration of civil contemnors.
The second reason civil contemnors should be entitled to jury trials
was described by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A. 22° Justice Scalia stated that courts have
their own initiaonly the "task of neutral adjudication" 221 and should not, on
222
The Founding
tive, prosecute crimes in the form of contempt citations.
Fathers carefully designed prosecution as a function of the Executive Branch
of government. 223 Justice Scalia makes his most compelling arguments by
discussing the effect Bloom had on the contempt powers:
[Contempt power] must be restrained by the totality of the
Constitution, lest it swallow up the carefully crafted guarantees of liberty .... While this principle may have varying
application to the jury-trial and separation-of-powers guarantees, it is inconceivable to me that it would not prevent so
flagrant a violation of the latter as permitting a judge to
promulgate a rule of behavior, prosecute its violation, and
adjudicate whether the violation took place.224
Young was another case of criminal contempt, but Justice Scalia's
reasoning is valid for civil contempt cases as well. All contennors must
receive due process in prosecutions of their cases, the exception being for
"orders necessary to protect the courts' ability to function., 225 Arguably,
this exception refers only to direct criminal contumacious acts, committed in

See Harmer, supra note 4, at 280 (arguing that if persons such as Bouknight are sus215.
pected of crimes, then prosecute them for those crimes instead of relying on coercive civil
contempt sanctions).
216. Id.
217. See Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1990).
218. Id.
219. See Livingston, supra note 21, at 398-99.
481 U.S. 787, 815-25 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
220.
Id. at 816 (Scalia, J., concurring).
221.
See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
222.
Id. at 817-18 (Scalia, J., concurring).
223.
Id. at 824 (Scalia, J., concurring).
224.
Id. at 815 (Scalia, J., concurring).
225.
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the courtroom to disrupt proceedings. 226 All other contempts deserve full
constitutional protections.
Third, civil contemnors should be entitled to a jury trial because the
Supreme Court in Bloom decided that serious criminal contempts should be
granted full due process protections.2 27 The Court opined, "[D]ispensing
with the jury in the trial of contempts subjected to severe punishment represents an unacceptable construction of the Constitution," and this rationale
applies with equal force to civil as well as criminal contempts.228 For example, Bouknight had been imprisoned nearly two years when the Supreme
Court heard her case. 229 The Court focused its decision on the Fifth
Amendment question and barely discussed the effect of the civil contempt
sanctions, even though its decision resulted in a long-term coercive incarceration for Bouknight. 230 Had the Court considered the matter based on due
process considerations, it might have decided the case in a manner similar to
Bloom.
In Bloom, the Court overturned a long line of cases when Justice
White, writing for the majority, stated:
Our deliberations have convinced us, however, that serious
contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they
are subject to the jury trial provisions of the Constitution,
now binding on the states, and that the traditional rule is
constitutionally infirm insofar as it permits other than petty
contempts to be tried without honoring a demand for a jury
trial.23'
The Court thereby distinguished serious from petty contempts and determined that a jury trial is needed if the contempt citation would result in serious sanctions.2 32 This ruling should apply equally to civil contemnors.
Since the Supreme Court overruled more than 65 years' worth of Debs'
precedent in Bloom, perhaps it will take only a similar case for the Court to
determine that civil contemnors are also entitled to jury trial protection if the
penalty is too severe.
The Supreme Court rulings in both Bloom and Bagwell show that
the Court is slowly moving toward requiring full due process rights to all
226. See Livingston, supra note 21, at 350.
227. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198-200 (1968).
228. Id. at 198.
229. See Valentine, supra note 201.
230. See Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1990).
231.
Bloom, 391 U.S. at 198.
232.
See id. (stating "serious contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they are
subject to the jury trial provisions of the Constitution," and traditional criminal contempt rules
are unconstitutional).
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accused contemnors.233 Civil contempt jury trials could be justified under
either the Sixth or Seventh Amendment since "[c]ontempts are neither
wholly civil nor altogether criminal. '234 Additionally, if the Court were to
rule that federal civil contemnors are entitled to jury protections under either
of these amendments, it would only take a small step to hold that states
the due process and
would be required to provide jury trials as well under235
Amendment.
Fourteenth
the
of
clauses
equal protection
The fourth reason civil contemnors should be entitled to a jury trial
236
Attorneys and
is because of the contempt power's potential for abuse.
punish a party
to
power
her
abuse
could
a
judge
that
fear
may
parties
other
a party from
prevents
that
way
a
in
proceedings
the
she dislikes, or control
237
potential for
the
recognized
Court
The Supreme
fully presenting his case.
abuse in Bloom, stating:
Over the years in the federal system there has been a recurring necessity to set aside punishments for criminal contempt as either unauthorized by statute or too harsh. This
course of events demonstrates the unwisdom of vesting the
judiciary with completely untrammeled power to punish
contempt, and makes clear the need for effective safeguards
against that power's abuse.238
The Court thereby recognized the potential for abuse in the contempt power
need to regulate punishments based on criminal contempt citaand the
239
tions.
The fifth argument for jury trials is that courts derive power from the
people, therefore contempt against the court is an insult to the authority of
the people. 240 This argument actually provides a compelling reason to allow
jury trials for civil contemnors. If courts in the United States derive their
power from the people, then the people in the form of a jury should determine whether an act, or a refusal to act, is contemptuous. The judge is impartial, and does not usurp the power of the people.

233. See Hostak, supra note 35, at 182.
234. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).
See Livingston, supra note 21, at 390-91.
235.
See Harmer, supra note 4, at 249-50 (stating that some judges have even held court
236.
spectators in contempt for failure to rise when the judge entered the courtroom).
See Livingston, supra note 21, at 351 (noting concern by some attorneys that judges
237.
could use the contempt power to "stifle that individual's expression in the courtroom.").
See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 206-07 (1968).
238.
Id.
239.
See Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341 (Miss. 1858).
240.
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The Importance of Bagwell: A New Test to Distinguish Civilfrom Criminal Contempt
The Supreme Court in Bagwell nearly completed a paradigm shift in
how the Court views summary adjudication of contempt. 241 The expanded
five-pronged test effectively shifted many contumacious acts from civil to
criminal classification, resulting in more due process protections for the alleged contemnor. 242 Although the new test addressed some of the due process concerns and alleviated many concerns about judicial bias and arbitrary
rulings, it only addressed concerns about the actual conduct of the contem243
nors indirectly.
The Bagwell test retained the Gompers character and purpose test,
244
but minimized the importance of the "mandatory/prohibitory" distinction.
Instead, the Court chose to focus on the increased complexity of injunctive
orders and the need for "elaborate and reliable factfinding (sic)" 245 to determine that one judge should not be the sole arbiter of a serious penalty against
an alleged contemnor. 24 The seriousness of the sanction therefore also became a determining factor in the classification of the contumacious act.247
The Court also required a purge clause in order to prove the classification as civil contempt. 248 Civil sanctions must be immediately purged if
the defendant and plaintiff settle the underlying dispute. 249 Because civil
contempt sanctions are for the benefit of the complainant, there is no longer
behavior by the defendant that need be coerced once the dispute is resolved.25 °
The general effect of the Bagwell decision is to classify more cases
of contempt as criminal rather than civil. 25' The Bagwell decision is also
important because it determined that violations of complex court orders
252
would usually be treated as criminal instead of civil contempt citations.
However, this reasoning would generally not pertain to simpler court orders,
such as the child visitation order at issue in Morgan's case.
241.
See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 838-39 (1994).
242.
See Livingston, supra note 21, at 347-48.
243. See id. (explaining that prior court decisions have failed to adequately identify the
policy rationale for different procedural requirements for civil vs. criminal contempt).
244. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 835-36.
245. Id. at 833-34.
246. Id. at 839.
247. Id. at 836-37.
248. Id. at 829.
249.
See Livingston, supra note 21, at 380.
250.
Id. at 352.
251.
Id. at 347 (explaining that the Bagwell decision drew the line between civil and
criminal contempts in such a way that most "substantial contempts" are now classified as
criminal, mandating a jury trial).
252.
Id. at 401.
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Additionally, the Court takes the Bagwell reasoning a step further by
applying policy considerations to its contempt reasoning.253 In the majority
opinion, Justice Blackmun wrote: "For a discrete category of indirect contempts, however, civil procedural protections may be insufficient ....Such
contempts do not obstruct the court's ability to adjudicate the proceedings
before it, and the risk of erroneous deprivation from the lack of a neutral
factfinder may be substantial. 254 Thus, the Bagwell case is the last in a
series of contempt cases where the United States Supreme Court has shown
a trend toward requiring more due process protections for accused contemnors. 255 To respond to due process concerns with other types of civil contempt, this author offers the following proposal.

A REASONABLE PROPOSAL
This article proposes that courts recognize due process protections
for all civil contemnors subject to lengthy coercive jail terms. A review of
Supreme Court decisions reveal that the Court is definitely moving toward
requiring full due process for most contemnors, and the Court is likely to
include coercive civil contempt in a future case. 6 Under the Bagwell reasoning, accused contemnors should be allowed a jury trial after no more than
eighteen months in jail. This imprisonment period is equal to those in both
the Federal Recalcitrant Witness Act and the District of Columbia Civil
Contempt Imprisonment Limitation Act.257 Both statutes impose an initial
imprisonment period to allow the coercive powers of the sanction an opportunity to affect the desired response from the contemnor. 258 If after eighteen
months' incarceration the civil contemnor has not relented, she may request
259
an expedited appeals process and a jury trial, similar to the D.C. statute.
The D.C. statute also requires that the expedited trial occur within 90 days of
the contemnor's petition for the appeal. 260 Additionally, the judge who imposed the coercive sentence upon the contemnor should not conduct this
26
trial, to avoid any possibility of judicial prejudice or conflict of interest. '
The jury trial entitlement effectively changes the character of the
contempt from civil to criminal.262 The jury will decide if the alleged contemnor is truly in contempt of court under the facts and circumstances of the
253. Id. at 386.
254. See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 833-34 (1994).
255. See Livingston, supra note 21, at 347-48.
256. Id. at 374.
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a); D.C. CODE ANN. §11-741 (Supp. 2001).
257.
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-741.
258.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-741 (Supp. 2001).
259.
See id.
260.
See Livingston, supra note 21, at 371-72 (noting that in civil contempt complaints,
261.
Justice Brennan favored using a disinterested attorney to investigate the complaint, rather than
charging the plaintiffs attorney with this task).
262. See Hostak, supra note 35, at 182.
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case. In most jurisdictions, however, the jury may not determine if the underlying court order is valid based on the collateral bar rule.263 Because coercive contempt sanctions benefit the complainant, jury instructions will
need to contain a balancing test to allow jurors to weigh the competing interests. On the complainant's side, the jury will need to consider the importance of the deed required of the contemnor, the possible effect on the complainant if the deed is not accomplished, and the interest of the State in having the contemnor's deed accomplished and the authority of its courts vindicated. 26 On the contemnor's side, the jury must determine the effect of continued incarceration on the contemnor's constitutional rights and the reasons
the contemnor believes she cannot comply. 265 In some cases, the contemnor
may believe she has complied with the order, and the jury must determine if
this is true.266 If the jury convicts, it will be under criminal contempt, and
the jury should recommend appropriate punishment for disobeying the court
order.
Courts and complainants will not like these protections because they
believe that it will allow contemnors to avoid doing the acts required by the
court. 267 However, in cases such as Dr. Elizabeth Morgan's and Jacqueline
Bouknight's, coercive civil contempt did not accomplish its intended effect,
leaving complainants no better off than they were prior to the incarcerations.268 Instead, Morgan and Bouknight were arguably worse off because
they were denied constitutional due process protections. 269 After reading her
story, there is little doubt that Morgan would have chosen to stay in jail until
Hilary turned eighteen to protect her from the alleged sexual abuse, regardless of whether she obtained a jury trial.270 Similarly, Maryland state officials admitted that after more than seven years, there was little hope that
Bouknight would relent and produce her son for authorities. 271 At least under this proposal, complainants will have the satisfaction that the contemnor
is lawfully being punished for failure to obey, rather than allowing a court to
violate a Person's constitutional rights under antiquated notions of judicial
powers.
The United States Supreme Court could create this result by deciding a coercive civil contempt case in a manner similar to Bloom. If a case is
presented for review with truly egregious facts, there is a strong possibility
that the Court would find that constitutional due process requires the protec263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See Livingston, supra note 21, at 411.
Id. at 418-19.
Id.
Id. at 398-99.
Id. at 409.
See Harmer, supra note 4, at 280-81.
Id.

270.
271.

See GRONER, supra note 3, at 235.
See Shatzkin, Obscured,supra note 206.

272.

See Harmer, supra note 5, at 280-81.
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tion of a jury trial before imposing long-term incarceration on a contemnor.
Therefore, federal and state courts should consider the Bagwell reasoning
when determining the outcome of current civil contempt cases in anticipation of such an outcome.
CONCLUSION

Recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Bloom and
Bagwell expanded due process protections granted to criminal contemnors.
The rationales given by the Court in these cases should also be conferred
upon civil contemnors, entitling them to greater protections against unreasonable incarcerations, which may include the right to a jury trial. This article proposes changes through court rulings in civil contempt cases, entitling
more contemnors to jury trial protections. In the United States Supreme
Court, the trend is to extend to contemnors as many constitutional protections as possible. Punishment for contempt should be a matter of justice,
rather than opinion. As shown by the cases of Elizabeth Morgan and Jacqueline Bouknight, coercive civil contempt in its current form can be a nowin proposition for all concerned.
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